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Abstract 12 
Previous research has shown that humorous reappraisal can reduce elicited negative emotions, 13 
suggesting that humor may be a functional strategy to cope with emotionally negative situations. 14 
However, the effect of humorous reappraisal on later memory about the emotion-eliciting situation is 15 
currently unknown, although this is crucial for more adaptive responding in future situations. To 16 
address this issue, we examined the effects of humorous reappraisal on both emotional experience 17 
and memory, compared to non-humorous rational reappraisal and a non-reappraisal control condition. 18 
Replicating previous findings, humorous reappraisal reduced evoked negative valence and arousal 19 
levels very effectively, and the down-regulation of experienced negative emotions was even more 20 
pronounced after humorous compared to rational reappraisal. Regarding later memory for emotion-21 
eliciting stimuli, both humorous and rational reappraisal reduced free recall, but recognition memory 22 
was unaffected, with memory strength being stronger after humorous than after rational reappraisal. 23 
These results indicate that humor seems to be indeed an optimal strategy to cope with negative 24 
situations because humor can help us to feel better when confronted with negative stimuli, but still 25 
allows us to retrieve stimulus information later when afforded to do so by the presence of appropriate 26 
contextual features. 27 
1. Introduction 28 
A central question of emotion research is how to functionally regulate evoked negative emotional 29 
experiences. As suggested early in psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1905/1960; 1928), one promising 30 
strategy to functionally regulate negative emotional experiences may be humor. Indeed, such an 31 
assumption seems to be supported by more recent experimental research, showing that viewing 32 
negative stimuli in a humorous way can reduce the strength of elicited negative emotions (e.g., 33 
Samson & Gross, 2012; Samson, Glassco, Lee, & Gross, 2014; Strick, Holland, van Baaren, & van 34 
Knippenberg, 2009). Such beneficial effects of humor have been attributed to a number of 35 
mechanisms such as cognitive distraction from negative stimuli (e.g., Strick et al., 2009), cognitive 36 
reappraisal of negative stimuli in less threatening ways (e.g., Samson & Gross, 2012), and an 37 
“undoing” of negative by positive emotions (Fredrickson & Levenson, 2000).  38 
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However, in order to more fundamentally evaluate the functionality of an emotion regulation 39 
strategy, it is not enough to look at the effects of emotion regulation on the strength of emotional 40 
responding in the current situation. Rather, it is additionally important to take into account the effects 41 
of emotion regulation on later memory about the emotion-eliciting event (e.g., Richards & Gross, 42 
2000). Basically, emotions are assumed to exist for the sake of signaling the consequences of a 43 
stimulus for one’s motives and goals (e.g., Frijda, 1988), with negative emotions signaling that 44 
stimuli may be harmful. Accordingly, in order to prepare the organism for a more adaptive 45 
responding in future situations, it would be adaptive to retain the emotion-eliciting stimuli as well as 46 
possible, an assumption which is supported by the fact that later memory for negative stimuli is 47 
typically enhanced compared to neutral stimuli (see Hamann, 2001, for a review). Thus, if an 48 
emotion regulation strategy would down-regulate negative emotional experiences at the cost of 49 
reduced memory for the emotion-eliciting event, it may help in the short term to cope with negative 50 
emotional experiences in the current situation, but it may be detrimental for a more adaptive 51 
responding to the negative event in future situations. 52 
Although the effects of humor on the strength of elicited negative emotions when confronted with 53 
negative stimuli have been examined in previous research, to our knowledge, research on the effects 54 
of humor on later memory about negative stimuli is lacking. In particular, the suggested mechanisms 55 
that may underlie the effects of humor on experienced emotions make rather different predictions 56 
about how humor may affect later memory. If the beneficial effect of humor on experienced emotions 57 
is based on the mechanism that humorous processing requires attentional resources so that people are 58 
distracted from negative stimuli (Strick et al., 2009), later memory for negative stimuli should be 59 
decreased because attention is a prerequisite for later memory (e.g., Mulligan, 2008), an assumption 60 
which is supported by the finding that emotion regulation by distraction seems to reduce later 61 
memory for the emotion eliciting event (e.g., Sheppes & Meiran, 2007). If the beneficial effect of 62 
humor on experienced emotions is based on a cognitive reinterpretation of negative stimuli in less 63 
threatening ways (Samson & Gross, 2012), later memory may not be affected by humor because the 64 
emotion-eliciting event is still fully attended, an assumption which is supported by the finding that 65 
(non-humorous) cognitive reappraisal seems not reduce later memory (Hayes, et al., 2010; Richards 66 
& Gross, 2000). Finally, it may even be that humor enhances later memory for humorously 67 
reappraised negative stimuli. If the beneficial effect of humor on experienced negative emotions is 68 
based on an undoing of negative by positive emotions, the evoked positive emotions may bring about 69 
an additional boost for memory (e.g., Herbert, Junghöfer, & Kissler, 2008), an assumption which is 70 
supported by findings that humorous material is better remembered than neutral material (e.g., 71 
Carlson, 2011; Schmidt, 1994; 2002). 72 
The aim of the present study was to examine the effects of humorous emotion regulation on both 73 
current emotional experiences and later memory about emotion-eliciting stimuli. Basically, we 74 
followed the procedure introduced by Samson and colleagues (2012; 2014) where participants rate 75 
their emotional responses to negative pictures that are shown with the instruction to either simply 76 
view the pictures (control condition), rationally reappraise the pictures (rational reappraisal 77 
condition), or humorously reappraise the pictures (humorous reappraisal condition). However, in 78 
order to overcome a few methodological shortcomings of previous studies, a number of changes were 79 
made. First, we included not only emotionally negative pictures but also emotionally neutral pictures 80 
in order to be able to examine whether the effects of humorous reappraisal are similar for neutral and 81 
negative pictures, or specific to negative pictures. Second, to standardize reappraisal, rather than 82 
asking participants to provide individual remarks in the reappraisal conditions, pictures were 83 
accompanied by standardized written humorous or rationalizing comments (for examples, see Fig. 1). 84 
Third, in order to control for the potential confounding effect that pictures in the control condition are 85 
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simply viewed whereas pictures in the reappraisal conditions are additionally verbally processed, 86 
pictures in the control condition were shown with a written comment as well that simply described 87 
the picture content. After picture presentation, memory for the pictures was assessed both for free 88 
recall and recognition memory, in order to obtain a comprehensive view of the effects of humor on 89 
later memory. 90 
With respect to the effects of humor on the strength of elicited emotional experiences, we expected 91 
that humorous reappraisals should down-regulate evoked negative emotions, replicating findings by 92 
Samson and Gross (2012). In particular, based on the recent findings of Samson and colleagues 93 
(2014), we expected that humorous reappraisal should be more effective in down-regulating negative 94 
emotions than rational reappraisal because the elicitation of positive emotions involved in 95 
humorously reappraisal can help to further “undo” negative emotions beyond the effects of purely 96 
rational reappraisal. With respect to the effects of humor on later memory for reappraised stimuli, if 97 
the beneficial effects of humor on emotional experiences are mainly based on cognitive distraction, 98 
memory performance should be decreased in the humorous reappraisal condition compared to the 99 
other conditions. If the beneficial effects of humor on emotional experiences are based on cognitive 100 
reappraisal, memory performance should be similar between the humorous and rational reappraisal 101 
conditions, and according to the findings by Richards and Gross (2000), memory performance in the 102 
reappraisal conditions should be comparable to the control condition. If the beneficial effects of 103 
humor on emotional experiences are based on an undoing of negative by positive emotions, memory 104 
performance in the humorous reappraisal condition may even be increased compared to the other 105 
conditions. 106 
2. Materials and Methods 107 
 108 
2.1. Participants 109 
To detect small-sized effects (d = 0.4, α = .05) with sufficient power (.80), a sample size of 52 is 110 
required. Therefore, we planned to collect data from at least 52 participants until the end of the 111 
semester. This resulted in a sample of 63 undergraduate students (45 females, mean age = 24.92 112 
years, SD = 4.61), who participated for course credit. Each person was tested individually. The study 113 
was conducted in accordance with the Helsinki declaration and the University Research Ethics 114 
Standards. 115 
2.2. Materials 116 
Twenty-four neutral and twenty-four negative pictures were selected. Most of the pictures were 117 
drawn from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995), 118 
additionally, three of the neutral pictures were taken from the Geneva affective picture database 119 
(GAPED; Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011). Pictures were chosen by the criteria of reasonableness and 120 
differentiability, and every negative picture was yoked with a visually similar neutral picture. 121 
Negative pictures were selected to be more negatively valenced and more arousing than neutral 122 
pictures (Valence: MNegative = 2.84, SD = 0.65; MNeutral = 5.33, SD = 0.52; Arousal: MNegative = M = 123 
5.59, SD = 0.80; MNeutral = 3.79, SD = 1.01).  124 
For each picture, a humorous, a rationalizing, and a neutral comment were generated (all comments 125 
are provided as Supplementary Material; for examples see Fig. 1). The humorous comments reflected 126 
a positive form of humor in the sense of Samson and Gross (2012) and were generated according to 127 
their instructions (i.e., reappraising in a benevolent and amusing way without becoming hostile or 128 
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aggressive, focusing on absurdities of situations). The rationalizing comments reflected a rational 129 
form of cognitive reappraisal in the sense of Richards and Gross (2000), and were generated 130 
according to their instructions (i.e., adopting a neutral attitude when watching a picture by thinking 131 
about it objectively and analytically); the non-reappraisal comments verbally described what could be 132 
seen on the picture. The three types of comments were matched on the number of words (MHumorous = 133 
14.52, MRational = 14.56, MNeutral = 13.96). 134 
2.3. Design and procedure 135 
A 2 x 3 within-subject design was used with the factors of emotional content of a picture (neutral vs. 136 
negative) and reappraisal condition (humorous vs. rational vs. neutral). The participants were shown 137 
the 24 neutral and 24 negatives pictures on a computer screen in random order using E-Prime 2.0 138 
(PST, Pittsburgh, PA) with the instruction to rate their emotional responses to each picture on 139 
valence (1 = extremely negative to 9 = extremely positive) and arousal (1 = not at all aroused to 9 = 140 
extremely aroused). No mention was made that memory for the pictures will be tested later. One third 141 
of the neutral, respectively negative, pictures were shown with a humorous comment, one third with 142 
a rationalizing comment, and one third with a neutral comment. The assignment of type of comments 143 
to the pictures was counterbalanced across participants. 144 
Each picture was shown for 10 sec at the center of the screen with the comment displayed below the 145 
picture (see Fig. 1). Participants were instructed to look at the pictures as long as they were presented 146 
and to read the respective comments carefully. After presentation of each picture, the valence and 147 
arousal scales were shown and participants made their ratings without any time restriction. After the 148 
presentation of all 48 pictures, a 1-min distractor phase followed in which participants had to solve 149 
simple arithmetic problems. A surprise free recall test for the presented pictures followed, in which 150 
participants were instructed to verbally describe on a provided sheet as many of the previously 151 
presented pictures as could be recalled any time restriction. After another 1-min distractor phase, a 152 
surprise recognition memory test followed. Participants were shown all initially presented pictures 153 
again together with 48 new pictures (24 negative and 24 neutral pictures, taken from the IAPS and 154 
GAPED data bases) in random order. In order to measure not only general recognition memory in an 155 
all-or-none fashion but also assess the memory strength of recognized pictures, we used a successive 156 
disclosure procedure. Each picture was presented in 100 gradation slides in ascending order, starting 157 
with a completely grey slide until the picture was entirely visible. Each gradation slide was shown for 158 
66 ms so that the picture sequence appeared as a continuum. Participants were asked to press a button 159 
as soon as they were able to identify a picture as having been shown before. If the disclosed picture 160 
was judged to be new, they were asked to wait until the picture was fully visible without pressing any 161 
button. General recognition memory was measured as the proportion of correctly recognized pictures 162 
independently of when the button was pressed during the disclosure sequence, and memory strength 163 
was measured as the time necessary for correctly recognizing a previously presented picture. 164 
3. Results 165 
3.1. Elicited emotions 166 
Figure 2 shows valence (2A) and arousal (2B) ratings of participants as a function of emotional 167 
content of pictures and reappraisal condition. To analyze the effect of type of reappraisal on 168 
emotional experiences, we conducted analyses of variances (ANOVA) for valence and arousal 169 
ratings with factors of emotional content of pictures (neutral vs. negative) and reappraisal condition 170 
(humorous vs. rational vs. control). For valence, there was a significant main effect of emotional 171 
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content of pictures, F(1, 62) = 152.62, p < .001, ηp² = .71, indicating that negative pictures were 172 
much more negatively experienced than neutral pictures. There was also a significant main effect of 173 
reappraisal condition, F(2, 124) = 14.94, p < .001, , ηp² = .19, indicating that experienced negativity 174 
varied as a function of type of reappraisal. The interaction between both factors was also significant, 175 
F(2, 124) = 10.60, p < .001, ηp² = .15, indicating that the differential effects of reappraisal type 176 
differed between neutral and negative pictures. For negative pictures, humorous reappraisal increased 177 
valence ratings compared to both the control condition, t(62) = 6.40, p < .001, d = 0.81, 95% CI: 0.43 178 
– 0.81, and the rational reappraisal condition, t(62) = 5.84, p < .001, d = 0.74, 95% CI: 0.35 – 0.72; 179 
valence ratings did not significantly differ between the rational reappraisal and control conditions, 180 
t(62) = 1.07, p = .290, d = 0.13, 95% CI: -0.07 – 0.25 For neutral pictures, valence ratings did not 181 
significantly differ between conditions, F(2, 124) = 1.02, p = .364, ηp² = .02. 182 
For arousal, there also were significant main effects of emotional content of pictures, F(1, 62) = 183 
97.35, p < .001, ηp² = .61, and reappraisal condition, F(2, 124) = 5.96, p = .003, ηp² = .09, and a 184 
significant interaction between both factors, F(2, 124) = 20.86, p < .001, ηp² = .25. For negative 185 
pictures, both humorous and rational reappraisal decreased arousal ratings, compared to the control 186 
condition, t(62) = -2.71, p = .009, d = 0.34, 95% CI: -0.46 – -0.07, and t(62) = -2.86, p = .006, d = 187 
0.36, 95% CI: -0.45 – -0.08, respectively; arousal ratings between the humorous and rational 188 
reappraisal conditions did not differ, t(62) = 0.00, p = .999, d = 0.00, 95% CI: -0.20 – 0.20. For 189 
neutral pictures, humorous reappraisal increased arousal ratings compared to both the control 190 
condition, t(62) = 3.43, p = .001, d = 0.43, 95% CI: 0.20 – 0.77, and the rational reappraisal 191 
condition, t(62) = 4.67, p < .001, d = 0.59, 95% CI: 0.36 – 0.94, whereas arousal ratings did not 192 
significantly differ between the rational reappraisal and control conditions, t(62) = -1.55, p = .126, d 193 
= 0.20, 95% CI: -0.39 – 0.05. 194 
3.2. Memory performance 195 
3.2.1. Free recall 196 
Figure 2C shows free recall memory performance as a function of emotional content of pictures and 197 
reappraisal condition. An ANOVA with factors of emotional picture content (neutral vs. negative) 198 
and reappraisal condition (neutral vs. humorous vs. rational) revealed a significant main effect of 199 
picture content, F(1, 62) = 70.84, p < .001, ηp² = .53, indicating that negative pictures were much 200 
better remembered than neutral pictures. There was also a significant main effect of reappraisal 201 
condition, F(2, 124) = 4.22, p = .017, , ηp² = .06, indicating that memory performance varied as a 202 
function of type of reappraisal. The interaction between both factors was not significant, F(2, 124) = 203 
0.66, p = .518, ηp² = .01. Overall, compared to the control condition, both humorous (MDecrease = -5.49 204 
%) and rational reappraisal (MDecrease = -5.37 %) decreased memory performance, t(62) = -2.35, p = 205 
.022, d = 0.30, 95% CI: -0.10 – -0.01, and t(62) = -2.98, p = .004, d = 0.38, 95% CI: -.09 – -.02, 206 
respectively. Amount of decrease did not differ between the humorous and rational reappraisal 207 
conditions, t(62) = -0.05, p = .961, d = 0.01. Analyzing data separately for negative and neutral 208 
pictures revealed that for negative pictures, memory performance was decreased both in the 209 
humorous and rational reappraisal conditions, compared to the control condition, t(62) = -2.51, p = 210 
.015, d = 0.31, 95% CI: -0.14 – -0.02, and t(62) = -2.12, p = .038, d = 0.27, 95% CI: -0.11 – 0.00, 211 
respectively. For neutral pictures, memory performance did not significantly differ between 212 
conditions, F(2, 124) = 1.20, p = .304, ηp² = .02. 213 
3.2.2. Recognition  214 
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The false alarm rate was very low and did not vary as a function of emotional contents of lures 215 
(MNegative = 2.05 %, SD = 2.89; MNeutral = 1.59 %, SD = 2.84), t(62) = 1.12, p < .266, d = 0.14, 95% 216 
CI: 0.00 – 0.13. Figure 2D (left panel) shows the proportion of correctly recognized pictures as a 217 
function of emotional content of pictures and reappraisal condition. An ANOVA with factors of 218 
emotional picture content (neutral vs. negative) and reappraisal condition (neutral vs. humorous vs. 219 
rational) revealed a significant main effect of picture content, F(1, 62) = 5.44, p = .023, ηp² = .08, 220 
indicating that negative pictures were better recognized than neutral pictures. There was also a 221 
significant main effect of reappraisal condition, F(2, 124) = 5.89, p = .004, ηp² = .09, indicating that 222 
recognition memory performance varied as a function of type of reappraisal. The interaction between 223 
both factors was also significant, F(2, 124) = 3.62, p = .030, ηp² = .06, indicating that the differential 224 
effects of reappraisal type differed between neutral and negative pictures. For negative pictures, 225 
recognition memory performance did not significantly differ between conditions, F(2, 124) = 0.53, p 226 
= .590, ηp² = .01. For neutral pictures, rational reappraisal decreased recognition memory 227 
performance compared to both the humorous condition, t(62) = -2.93, p = .005, d = 0.37, 95% CI: -228 
0.06 – -0.01, and the control reappraisal condition, t(62) = -2.87, p = .006, d = 0.36, 95% CI: -0.07 – 229 
-0.01; recognition memory performance did not significantly differ between the humorous 230 
reappraisal and control conditions, t(62) = -0.241, p = .811, d = 0.03, 95% CI: -.02 – 0.01. 231 
Figure 2D (right panel) shows the time necessary for correctly recognizing a previously presented 232 
picture, reflecting underlying memory strength, as a function of emotional content of pictures and 233 
reappraisal condition. An ANOVA with factors of emotional picture content (neutral vs. negative) 234 
and reappraisal condition (neutral vs. humorous vs. rational) revealed a significant main effect of 235 
picture content, F(1, 62) = 28.37, p < .001, ηp² = .31, indicating that negative pictures were more 236 
quickly recognized than neutral pictures. There was also a significant main effect of reappraisal 237 
condition, F(2, 124) = 3.07, p = .050, ηp² = .05, indicating that recognition speed varied as a function 238 
of type of reappraisal. The interaction between both factors was not significant, F(2, 124) = 0.53, p = 239 
.591, ηp² = .01. In the rational reappraisal condition, recognition speed was decreased compared to 240 
both the humorous condition, t(62) = -1.96, p = .054, d = 0.25, 95% CI: -2.79 – 0.03, and the control 241 
condition, t(62) = -2.43, p = .018, d = 0.31, 95% CI: -2.72 – -.26. Recognition speed did not differ 242 
between the humorous and control conditions, t(62) = 0.16, p < .873, d = 0.02, 95% CI: -1.27 – 1.49. 243 
4. Discussion 244 
In the present study, we investigated whether humor may be a functional strategy to regulate negative 245 
emotions by examining the effects of humorous reappraisal compared to rational reappraisal and non-246 
reappraisal on evoked emotional experiences and later memory for the emotion-eliciting stimuli. The 247 
results showed that humor seems to be indeed an optimal strategy to adaptively cope with stimuli that 248 
elicit negative emotions. Regarding evoked emotional experiences, humorous reappraisal reduced 249 
experienced negative valence and arousal, replicating previous findings (Samson & Gross, 2012). 250 
Thus, humor can indeed help us to feel better when being confronted with negative events. In 251 
particular, replicating the recent findings by Samson and colleagues (2014), our results showed that 252 
humorous reappraisal is more successful in down-regulating negative emotions than rational 253 
reappraisal because rational reappraisal reduced only arousal levels but not experienced negative 254 
valence. 255 
Regarding later memory for emotion-eliciting stimuli, the results showed that humorous reappraisal 256 
reduced free recall for negative stimuli compared to non-reappraisal, indicating that humor reduces 257 
the presence of previously experienced negative events in mind when actively reconstructing our 258 
past. However, the results for the recognition test showed that at the same time recognition memory 259 
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for negative stimuli was completely intact in the humorous reappraisal condition, indicating that 260 
emotion-eliciting events were still fully stored in memory. From a functional perspective, such a 261 
pattern seems to be adaptive because on the one hand, undergone negative experiences less strongly 262 
infiltrate our minds when remembering our past in contexts that do not match the previous emotion-263 
eliciting situation. On the other hand, however, when the contextual information matches the features 264 
of the previous emotion-eliciting situation, then past experiences can nevertheless be fully retrieved 265 
in order to prepare for appropriate responding. In particular, similar to the effects on elicited 266 
emotional experiences, humorous reappraisal seems to be even more functional than rational 267 
reappraisal because rational reappraisal did not only reduce free recall but also reduce the strength of 268 
recognition memory. 269 
There is still a debate on whether the effectiveness of humor as an emotion regulation strategy is 270 
attributable to the mechanisms of cognitive distraction from negative stimuli (e.g., Strick et al., 271 
2009), or to cognitive reappraisal of negative stimuli in less threatening ways (e.g., Samson & Gross, 272 
2012). Previous research has shown that distraction and reappraisal differ with respect to the 273 
consequences for later memories about the emotion-eliciting event, with distraction, but not 274 
reappraisal, impairing later recognition memory (e.g., Richards & Gross, 2000; Sheppes & Meiran, 275 
2007). Thus, the finding of the present study that humorous reappraisal did not impair recognition 276 
memory strongly supports the view that the mechanism underlying humor as an emotion regulation 277 
strategy is reappraisal. 278 
Indeed, such a view is further supported by the finding that humorous reappraisal differentially 279 
affected recognition memory and free recall. Whereas humor did not influence recognition memory, 280 
free recall was impaired. Such a pattern speaks against the assumption that distraction may underlie 281 
the effects of humorous reappraisal because previous research has shown that cognitive distraction 282 
during encoding impairs both free recall and recognition memory (e.g., Craik, Govoni, Naveh-283 
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996). Instead, such differential effects on recognition and free recall support 284 
the assumption that the effect of humor is based on cognitive reappraisal. One factor which is known 285 
to differentially influence free recall and recognition is whether processing during encoding is 286 
focused on the relationship between a stimulus and other stimuli (i.e., relational processing), or on 287 
the individual characteristics of a stimulus (i.e., item-specific processing). Whereas item-specific 288 
processing reduces free recall because the memory representation of a stimulus is less strongly 289 
activated by other stored stimuli so that active reproduction is impaired, item-specific processing 290 
does not impair recognition memory because an active reproduction of the to-be-remembered 291 
stimulus is not necessary for recognition (e.g., Einstein & Hunt, 1980; Engelkamp, Biegelmann, & 292 
McDaniel, 1998). Thus, as the attempt to reappraise a stimulus in a humorous way requires focusing 293 
on the to-be-reappraised stimulus, the underlying mechanism of the effects of humor on memory 294 
seems to be the induction of item-specific processing. 295 
In fact, a similar mechanism may explain the effect of rational reappraisal on memory. Replicating 296 
previous findings, recognition accuracy for negative pictures was not impaired by rational reappraisal 297 
(Hayes et al., 2010; Richards & Gross, 2000). However, going beyond previous findings, the present 298 
results demonstrate that free recall is impaired. Thus, similar to humorous reappraisal, rational 299 
reappraisal seems also to induce an item-specific processing of the to-be-reappraised stimuli, leading 300 
to the observed differential effects on later free recall and recognition memory. However, with 301 
respect to the effects on elicited emotions, the results indicate that cognitive reappraisal alone is less 302 
effective in down-regulating negative emotions than when the cognitive reappraisal additionally 303 
evokes positive emotions due to a humorous reinterpretation of stimuli. Thus, an evoking of positive 304 
emotions, as induced by humorous reappraisal, seems to be necessary to really undo experienced 305 
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negative emotions (e.g., Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998). However, the undoing of negative by 306 
humor-induced positive emotions seems not to be strong enough to bring about an additional boost in 307 
memory. 308 
One interesting finding of the present study is that rational reappraisal was rather ineffective in down-309 
regulating negative emotions because only elicited emotional arousal but not negative valence was 310 
reduced. On first glance, such a finding seems to deviate from previous studies showing decreased 311 
valence ratings when rationally reappraising compared to when simply watching emotion-eliciting 312 
stimuli in a non-reappraisal control condition (e.g., Hayes et al., 2010; Richards & Gross, 2000). 313 
However, a closer look reveals that there is one important difference between the present and the 314 
previous studies. In previous studies, reappraisal and control conditions differed not only in terms of 315 
reappraisal but also in terms of cognitive processing in general because participants in the control 316 
condition were instructed to simply watch the pictures, whereas in the reappraisal condition 317 
additional cognitive processing was required. In the present study, the control and reappraisal 318 
conditions were matched on required cognitive processing in order to control for the potential 319 
confounding effect of cognitive processing in general. The finding that the benefits from rational 320 
reappraisal were rather small under such conditions suggest that the down-regulating of negative 321 
emotions found in previous studies may more likely reflect the effect of cognitive processing in 322 
general, rather than specific effects of rational reappraisal. Indeed, such an assumption is supported 323 
by recent findings showing that additional cognitive processing during the perception of emotional 324 
events can reduce negative emotions (e.g., Strick et al., 2009; Van Dillen & Koole, 2007). However, 325 
given that the present study did not include a condition where emotional stimuli were simply 326 
watched, further research is needed to clarify the specific effects of rational reappraisal beyond the 327 
effects of cognitive processing in general. 328 
In the present study, the form of reappraisal employed in the rational reappraisal condition reflected a 329 
rational form of cognitive reappraisal where emotion regulation is based on the attempt to adopt a 330 
neutral attitude when watching a picture by thinking about it objectively and analytically (e.g., 331 
Richars & Gross, 2000). However, there are other forms of cognitively reappraising emotionally 332 
negative situations, such as trying to think about a situation in a more positive light, or thinking about 333 
the positive bearing an event could have on the persons involved in the situation (e.g., Troy, 334 
Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010). One important difference between these different forms of 335 
cognitive reappraisals is that the latter one may additionally elicit positive emotions due to the 336 
thinking about potential positive aspects of the given negative situation. Thus, it may be that such 337 
“positive” forms of cognitive reappraisal may be similar effective than humorous reappraisal where 338 
the elicitation of positive emotions seems to play an important role as well, an open question that 339 
warrants future research. 340 
In conclusion, humor seems to be indeed an especially functional emotion regulation strategy that 341 
can outperform other emotion regulation strategies such as rational reappraisal. Thus, Freud 342 
(1905/1960) may indeed have been right in assuming that humor can be seen as the most valuable 343 
high-level defense of unpleasure. 344 
 345 
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Figure legends 407 
Figure 1: Procedure of the experiment. Participants were shown 24 negative and 24 neutral 408 
pictures provided with a neutral, rational, or humorous comment in random order. Each picture was 409 
rated on experienced emotional valence and arousal. After picture presentation, a surprise memory 410 
test followed. In a first free recall test, participants were asked to verbally describe as many of the 411 
previously presented pictures as possible. In a subsequent recognition test, all initially presented 412 
pictures were shown again together with 48 new pictures, and participants were instructed to indicate 413 
whether a picture was old or new. In order to measure memory strength of recognized pictures, we 414 
used a successive disclosure procedure where participants were asked to press a button as soon as 415 
they were able to identify a picture as having been shown before. 416 
Figure 2. Results of the Experiment. (A) Emotional valence ratings (1 = extremely negative to 9 = 417 
extremely positive), (B) emotional arousal ratings (1 = not at all aroused to 9 = extremely aroused), 418 
(C) free recall performance, and (D) recognition performance as a function of emotional content of 419 
pictures (neutral, negative) and reappraisal condition (control, rational, humorous). The left panel in 420 
(D) shows recognition accuracy (probability of correct recall), the right panels shows the time needed 421 
to correctly identify a previously presented. Error bars represent standard errors. 422 
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